

Grid Security Infrastructure

Globus Toolkit™ Developer Tutorial

The Globus Project™


Argonne National Laboratory

USC Information Sciences Institute

<http://www.globus.org/>

Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)

- GSI is:



Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- PKI allows you to know that a given public key belongs to a given user
- PKI builds off of asymmetric encryption:
 - Each entity has two keys: public and private
 - Data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted with other.
 - The private key is known only to the entity
- The public key is given to the world encapsulated in a X.509 certificate




Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Overview

- X.509 Certificates
- Certificate Authorities (CAs)
- Certificate Policies
 - Namespaces
- Requesting a certificate
 - Certificate Request
 - Registration Authority




Certificates

- A X.509 certificate binds a public key to a name
- It includes a name and a public key (among other things) bundled together and signed by a trusted party (Issuer)




Certificates

- Similar to passport or driver's license




Certificates

- By checking the signature, one can determine that a public key belongs to a given user.




Digital Signatures

- Digital Signatures : Authenticity and Non-Denial




Certificate Authorities (CAs)

- A small set of trusted entities known as Certificate Authorities (CAs) are established to sign certificates
- A Certificate Authority is an entity that exists only to sign user certificates
- The CA signs it's own certificate which is distributed in a trusted manner




Certificate Authorities (CAs)

- The public key from the CA certificate can then be used to verify other certificates



Requesting a Certificate

- To request a certificate a user starts by generating a key pair
- The private key is stored encrypted with a pass phrase the user gives
- The public key is put into a certificate request




Certificate Issuance

- The user then takes the certificate to the CA
- The CA usually includes a Registration Authority (RA) which verifies the request:
 - The name is unique with respect to the CA
 - It is the real name of the user
 - Etc.




Certificate Issuance

- The CA then signs the certificate request and issues a certificate for the user




Secure Socket Layer (SSL)


- Also known as TLS (Transport Layer Security)
- Uses certificates and TCP sockets to provide a secured connection
 - Authentication of one or both parties using the certificates
 - Message protection
 - > Confidentiality (encryption)
 - > Integrity



Mutual authentication




Mutual authentication




Certificates

- By checking the signature, The server can determine that the public key belongs to the client.




Mutual authentication




Identifying the sender

- Client can use his private key to sign the probe
- Server opens the sealed document using client's public key – this way, he is sure the sender is really the client



Mutual authentication



Globus Security Review

- GSI extends existing standard protocols & APIs
 - Based on standards: SSL/TLS, X.509, GSS-API
 - Extensions for single sign-on and delegation
- The Globus Toolkit provides:
 - Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) on GSI protocols
 - > **The GSS-API is the IETF standard for adding authentication, delegation, message integrity, and message confidentiality to applications.**
 - Various tools for credential management, login/logout, etc.


Obtaining a Certificate I.

- The program `grid-cert-request` is used to create a public/private key pair and unsigned certificate in `~/.globus/`:
 - `usercert_request.pem`: Unsigned certificate file
 - `userkey.pem`: Encrypted private key file
 - > Must be readable **only** by the owner

Requesting a Certificate

- To request a certificate a user starts by generating a key pair
- The private key is stored encrypted with a pass phrase the user gives
- The public key is put into a certificate request

grid-cert-request




Obtaining a Certificate II.

- Mail `usercert_request.pem` to `ca@globus.org`
- Receive a Globus-signed certificate
Place in `~/.globus/usercert.pem`
- Other organizations use different approaches
 - NCSA, NPACI, NASA, etc. have their own CA

Certificate Issuance


- The CA then signs the certificate request and issues a certificate for the user



Requesting a Certificate

grid-cert-request

- To request a certificate a user starts by generating a key pair
- The private key is stored encrypted with a pass phrase the user gives
- The public key is put into a certificate request



Your New Certificate

Certificate:

**NTP is highly
recommended**



Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 28 (0x1c)

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, O=Globus, CN=Globus Certification Authority

Validity

Not Before: Apr 22 19:21:50 1998 GMT

Not After : Apr 22 19:21:50 1999 GMT

Subject: C=US, O=Globus, O=NACI, OU=SDSC, CN=Richard Frost

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)

Modulus (1024 bit):

00:bf:4c:9b:ae:51:e5:ad:ac:54:4f:12:52:3a:69:

<snip>

b4:e1:54:e7:87:57:b7:d0:61

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

59:86:6e:df:dd:94:5d:26:f5:23:c1:89:83:8e:3c:97:fc:d8:

<snip>

8d:cd:7c:7e:49:68:15:7e:5f:24:23:54:ca:a2:27:f1:35:17:

Certificate and Key Data

Sample usercert.pem:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
MIICAzCCAWygAwIBAgIBCDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBHMQswCQY  
    <snip>  
u5tX5R1m7LrBeI3dFMviJudlihloXfJ2BduIg7XOKk5g3JmgauK4  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Sample userkey.pem:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----  
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED  
DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,1E924694DBA7D9D1  
+W4FEPdn/oYntAJPw2tfmrGZ82FH611o1gtvjSKH79wdFxxzKhnz474Ijo5B1  
    <snip>  
et5QnJ6hAO4Bhya1XkWyKHTPs/2tIf1Kn0BNIIIIYM+s=  
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Certificate Information

- To get cert information run `grid-cert-info`
 % `grid-cert-info -subject`
 /C=US/O=Globus/O=ANL/OU=MCS/CN=Ian Foster
- Options for printing cert information
 - all
 - subject
 - issuer
 - startdate
 - enddate
 - help

Autentikáció a Gridben III.

- Egyszeri beléptetés (Single Sign-On)
 - A felhasználó csak egyszer azonosítja magát, azután minden Grid szolgáltatást használhat
- Jogosultság-delegáció (credential delegation)
 - A felhasználó által indított munkafolyamatok a felhasználó nevében tevékenykedhetnek
- A titkos kulcsot nem akarjuk a munkafolyamatokra bízni
- Megoldás: Proxy tanúsítványok
 - A felhasználó által létrehozott kulcspárok
 - A nyilvános kulcsot a felhasználó a saját titkos kulcsával hitelesíti
 - Korlátozott ideig érvényesek és/vagy korlátozott jogosultságokkal bírnak


“Logging on” to the Grid

- To run programs, authenticate to Globus:
% `grid-proxy-init`
Enter PEM pass phrase: `*****`
- Creates a temporary, local, short-lived proxy credential for use by our computations
- Options for `grid-proxy-init`:
 - hours <lifetime of credential>
 - bits <length of key>
 - help

grid-proxy-init Details


- **grid-proxy-init** creates the local proxy file.
- User enters pass phrase, which is used to decrypt private key.
- Private key is used to sign a proxy certificate with its own, new public/private key pair.
 - User's private key not exposed after proxy has been signed
- Proxy placed in /tmp, read-only by user
- NOTE: *No network traffic!*
- **grid-proxy-info** displays proxy details

Grid Sign-On With grid-proxy-init



Autentikáció a Gridben IV.

- A proxy tanúsítványok további proxyk létrehozására is alkalmasak (delegáció), így tanúsítvány-lánc hozható létre



- A proxy hitelességének ellenőrzéséhez az egész láncolatot be kell járni

Destroying Your Proxy (logout)

- To destroy your local proxy that was created by `grid-proxy-init`:
 - `% grid-proxy-destroy`
- This does *NOT* destroy any proxies that were delegated from this proxy.
 - You cannot revoke a remote proxy
 - Usually create proxies with short lifetimes

Proxy Information

- To get proxy information run `grid-proxy-info`
% `grid-proxy-info -subject`
`/C=US/O=Globus/O=ANL/OU=MCS/CN=Ian Foster`
- Options for printing proxy information
 - subject
 - issuer
 - type
 - timeleft
 - strength
 - help
- Options for scripting proxy queries
 - exists -hours <lifetime of credential>
 - exists -bits <length of key>
 - Returns 0 status for true, 1 for false:

Important Files

- `/etc/grid-security`
 - `hostcert.pem`: certificate used by the server in mutual authentication
 - `hostkey.pem`: private key corresponding to the server's certificate (read-only by root)
 - `grid-mapfile`: maps grid subject names to local user accounts (really part of gatekeeper)
- `/etc/grid-security/certificates`
 - `CA certificates`: certs that are trusted when validating certs, and thus needn't be verified
 - `ca-signing-policy.conf`: defines the subject names that can be signed by each CA

Important Files

- `$HOME/.globus`
 - **usercert.pem**: User's certificate (subject name, public key, CA signature)
 - **userkey.pem**: User's private key (encrypted using the user's pass phrase)
- `/tmp`
 - **Proxy file(s)**: Temporary file(s) containing unencrypted proxy private key and certificate (readable only by user's account)
 - > Same approach Kerberos uses for protecting tickets

Secure Services

- On most unix machines, **inetd** listens for incoming service connections and passes connections to daemons for processing.
- On Grid servers, the **gatekeeper** securely performs the same function for many services
 - It handles mutual authentication using files in `/etc/grid-security`
 - It maps to local users via the **gridmap file**


Sample Gridmap File

- Gridmap file maintained by Globus administrator
- Entry maps Grid-id into local user name(s)

# Distinguished name	Local username
#	
"/C=US/O=Globus/O=NPACI/OU=SDSC/CN=Rich Gallup"	rpg
"/C=US/O=Globus/O=NPACI/OU=SDSC/CN=Richard Frost"	frost
"/C=US/O=Globus/O=USC/OU=ISI/CN=Carl Kesselman"	u14543
"/C=US/O=Globus/O=ANL/OU=MCS/CN=Ian Foster"	itf

Example Secure Remote Startup

1. Exchange certificates, authenticate, delegate
2. Check gridmap file
3. Lookup service
4. Run service program (e.g. jobmanager)



Simple job submission

- globus-job-run provides a simple RSH compatible interface

```
% grid-proxy-init
Enter PEM pass phrase: *****
% globus-job-run host program [args]
```
- Job submission will be covered in more detail later

Delegation

- Delegation = remote creation of a (second level) proxy credential
 - New key pair generated remotely on server
 - Proxy cert and public key sent to client
 - Client signs proxy cert and returns it
 - Server (usually) puts proxy in /tmp
- Allows remote process to authenticate on behalf of the user
 - Remote process “impersonates” the user

Limited Proxy

- During delegation, the client can elect to delegate only a “limited proxy”, rather than a “full” proxy
 - GRAM (job submission) client does this
- Each service decides whether it will allow authentication with a limited proxy
 - Job manager service requires a full proxy
 - GridFTP server allows either full or limited proxy to be used

Restricted Proxies

- A generalization of the simple limited proxies
 - Desirable to have fine-grained restrictions
 - Reduces exposure from compromised proxies
- Embed restriction policy in proxy cert
 - Policy is evaluated by resource upon proxy use
 - Reduces rights available to the proxy to a subset of those held by the user
 - > A proxy no longer grants full impersonation rights
 - Extensible to support any policy language
- Will be in future version > GT 2.0


Elektronikus kulcskiosztó rendszer I.

- A proxy tanúsítvány létrehozásához a felhasználónak szüksége van a titkos kulcsára
- Általában a titkos kulcsot a felhasználó felügyeli
- Egy jelszóval védett fájl a home könyvtárban
- A kulcskezelés terhét a felhasználó viseli, aki esetleg nem tudja, vagy nem akarja megfelelő gondossággal kezelni kulcsait
 - Véletlen törlések, akaratlan kulcskiszivárogtatás
 - A különböző erőforrásokhoz más-más kulcspárok tartozhatnak


Elektronikus kulcskiosztó rendszer II.

- Az elektronikus kulcskiosztó rendszer (Online Credential Retrieval System, OCRS)
 - Központi adatbázisban tárolja a felhasználók kulcspárait
 - A felhasználó kérésére proxy tanúsítványt állít elő és küld vissza
- Az OCRS előnyei
 - Leegyszerűsíti a rendszeradminisztrátorok munkáját (több ezer felhasználós rendszerek is előfordulhatnak)
 - A felhasználót mentesíti a kulcskezelés feladata alól
 - Az egész rendszer biztonságát növeli
 - A váratlanul hosszú ideig futó munkafolyamatok a felhasználó közbeavatkozása nélkül is igényelhetnek kiterjesztett érvényességű proxy tanúsítványokat

Alapvető működés




A proxy tanúsítványok felhasználása




- PS: proxy tanúsítvány és titkos kulcs
- RS: korlátozott jogosultságú proxy tanúsítvány és titkos kulcs

Visszavont tanúsítványok kezelése



- CRL: Certificate Revocation List, Tanúsítvány-visszavonó lista

Adatbázisreplikák, vándorló kliensek



OCR implementáció I.

- **Kódolatlan kulcsadatbázis**
 - Az OCR szerver kódolatlanul tárolja a titkos kulcsokat
 - Lehetővé teszi a jelszótovábbítás nélküli autentikációt, illetve az alternatív autentikációs eljárásokat (OTP, Kerberos)
 - Az OCR számára dedikált gépet kell elkülöníteni
- **Háttéradatbázis moduláris implementációja**
 - Kis felhasználóbázis esetén az egyszerű szövegfájl is elég
 - Nagy terhelés: hasítótábla
 - Nagy terhelés, nagy felhasználóbázis: valódi adatbáziskezelő

OCR implementáció II.

- Kliens interfész
 - Adott lejáratú proxy tanúsítvány igénylése
 - Korlátozott jogosultságú proxy tanúsítvány igénylése
- Adminisztratív felület
 - Új felhasználó létrehozása, felhasználó letiltása és törlése
 - Autentikációs eljárás kiválasztása, jelszóbeállítás
 - Új tanúsítvány feltöltése, tanúsítvány letiltása és törlése
 - Automatikus kulcspárgenerálás, és továbbítás a helyi hitelesítő hatósághoz
- CRL gyorsítótár implementálása a hálózat terhelésének csökkentésére

Köszönöm a figyelmüket



További információ: www.lpds.sztaki.hu